An Overview of Hizballah's Activities in Canada in the Aftermath of the Soleimani Strike

Originally published by the Intrepid Podcast Blog

*This article was originally published by the Intrepid Podcast Blog

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It is widely expected that Iran will retaliate for the killing of General Soleimani by the United States, although it is not clear how just yet. Jessica Davis looks at how the activities of Iranian-backed entities (particularly by Hizballah) in Canada might figure in to such a response and the challenge that poses for Canadian national security agencies.

On Friday, 3 January 2020, Qassem Soleimani, longtime leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps - Qods Force (IRGC-QF) was killed in a US drone strike. The Qods Force, and (before he was killed) Soleimani directly, plays a significant role in financing terrorist groups around the world, including the Taliban, Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC).  International consensus is that Iran will retaliate for the assassination, but questions remain as to when and how. One of the possibilities - terrorist attacks by Hizballah - has significant implications for Canada because Canada is home to a Hizballah facilitation network that could be used to enable Hizballah operations, including terrorist attacks.

Hints of a Hizballah financing and facilitation network have surfaced in Canada for decades. In the late 1990s, Ward Elcock, then-director of CSIS, stated that Hizballah had an active presence in Canada. (He also noted that there were 50 organizational and 350 individual terrorist targets under investigation in Canada, some of which were, but logical extension, Hizballah-related). Some of the activities Hizballah members have engaged in involve the procurement of goods that can be used to support operational activity, such as night vision goggles and laser range finders, as well as explosive material. This procurement network was funded in part from funds sent from Lebanon, but also through criminal activities in Canada such as credit card and banking scams. The financing network also sought to take out life insurance policies for Hizballah operatives committing acts of terrorism in the Middle East, another method of raising funds for the group. Hizballah members have also stolen cars in Canada and transferred large sums of money (presumably from their various criminal activities) to Lebanon.

Hizballah’s activities in Canada do not stop there. Intelligence from the late 1990s suggested that Hizballah had also taken video of potential Canadian targets in the event that Hizballah wanted to target Canada, as per intelligence provided by a refugee (and Hizballah member) to Canada. According to reporting from Stewart Bell, in 2008 and 2009, CSIS probed the possibility that Hizballah might attack Israel’s diplomatic assets or Canada’s Jewish community in response to the assassination of Hizballah mastermind Imad Mughniey.

More recently, FINTRAC reported that individuals in Canada are involved in businesses and other professions that provide financial resources to Hizballah, and that the group maintains an international network of “charities, non-profit organizations and other organizations sympathetic to its cause”, some of which are in Canada.

Canada’s response to Hizballah activities is somewhat confusing and perhaps inconsistent. The IRGC - QF has been a listed entity in Canada since 2012. At the same time, there have been no charges (and no convictions) against Hizballah members, and there has also been no sanctions enforcement of Canada’s broader sanctions against Iran.

It remains critical to note that Hizballah gets most of its money from Iran. At the same time, Hizballah’s financing networks outside of the Middle East provide the group with a modicum of independence from Iranian oversight and direction, and also provide methods to move money into sensitive areas without having to do some from jurisdictions with known links to the terrorist group. This allows the money to move with less suspicion and scrutiny. These financing and procurement networks, including those in Canada, provide the organization with more flexibility, allowing the nodes and actors in the network to be developed and used for both financial and operational activity.  

So what does this all mean for Canada in the wake of Soleimani’s assassination? In the short term, Canada is unlikely to be a direct target of Hizballah attack; however, there is a possibility that US or Israeli assets in Canada could be targeted as part of a broader retaliatory attack by Hizballah for the killing of Suleimani. Canadian Hizballah financing and facilitation networks and cells could also be used to fund and enable terrorist operations around the world, including against our allies, most notably of course the United States, which represents a significant reputational risk.

Canada has options for potential action that could help mitigate both of these risks. There is little doubt that there are ongoing investigations into Hizballah activities in Canada, but these investigations need to be properly staffed and prioritized. Of course, this is easier said than done given the multitude of threats facing Canada. Each of these investigations should have a parallel financial investigation – the primary investigation should focus on threat to life or infrastructure. In parallel, the financial investigation should work illuminate the network, support arrest and prosecution of terrorism offences, but also to provide options for financial disruption should arrest and prosecution prove impossible. All Hizballah investigations are likely to have a significant financial component, given the nature of the group’s activities in Canada, meaning that a parallel investigation would be a profound force multiplier for the effort. Now would also be a great time to develop specialized prosecutors who can deal with financially complex terrorism cases, as any potential Hizballah prosecution in Canada would likely be.