Is Negotiating with Terrorists a Valid Counter-Terrorism Method?
Primer
Kidnapping for ransom is a lucrative business that generates significant funds for terrorist groups each year. The policy of not negotiating with terrorists, famously declared by President Nixon during a 1970s hostage crisis in Sudan, has been an integral position of American and Canadian foreign policy for decades. Despite this public stance, the reality of negotiation as a counter terrorism measure is complex. States face the dilemma of whether to engage with terrorists to save lives or to maintain a hard line to deter future acts of terrorism. Since 2010, over $1 billion has been paid to a variety of terrorist organizations to free hostages. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the non-negotiation policy: is it a realistic approach for counter terrorism, and can it be employed to increase chances of successful outcomes?
This primer presents an overview of the common arguments for and against negotiating with terrorists, as well as negotiation best practices. For a look at the effect of paying ransoms for terrorism itself, check out an article that Jessica co-authored in 2022:
What do we mean by negotiation, and who is involved?
Negotiation, fundamentally, is a process of discussion aimed at reaching an agreement. In the realm of counter terrorism, engaging in negotiations with terrorist groups is often equated with governments yielding to their demands. In reality, these discussions can involve a broader set of tactics and actors beyond the state. While typically envisioned scenarios involve governments paying ransoms in response to hostage situations, negotiations can also encompass other forms of objectives and concessions, such as prisoner exchanges or offers of amnesty. Additionally, other parties, including families and businesses, can trigger or influence the outcome of negotiations and are necessary to understand the full scope of the strategy.
Policy Positions of Different States
Many Western nations, including the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, officially maintain a policy of not negotiating with terrorists, particularly in hostage situations. This stance was asserted by Canada during the kidnapping of John Ridsdel and Robert Hall by Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines in 2015. After Canada held firm to the policy of non-negotiation and not meeting ransom demands, Ridsdel and Hall were executed. The event was controversial and although it highlighted the consequences of a non-negotiation doctrine, Canada still officially holds the same policies regarding hostage-taking.
Regardless of the official position of states, negotiations still happen regularly. Presently, Israel has ongoing mediated discussions with Hamas on a truce and hostage deal. Historically, the Spanish government has engaged with ETA, the British government with the IRA, and the Taliban alleged that South Korea paid more than $20 million for the freedom of 19 hostages. Despite official statements to the contrary, it was reported that Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler's release from captivity in Niger involved a ransom payment of $1.1 million in 2009. The United States, while generally adhering to a non-negotiation policy, has also faced its own controversies, such as the exchange of five Taliban prisoners for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in 2014. These instances highlight that, despite public declarations and posturing, negotiations with terrorists do occur.
In addition to state-level negotiations, there are instances where families and private corporations take matters into their own hands. The case of Canadian Amanda Lindhout in Somalia is one example, where her family raised funds for her release when the government ceased its involvement. Private companies also often pay ransoms for their employees, with a significant number of Fortune 500 companies carrying kidnap and ransom insurance for workers in high-risk areas. This insurance typically activates specialized risk-response teams to handle the situations.
Benefits of Non-Negotiation
Several key arguments advocating for non-negotiation with terrorists and emphasize the potential dangers or counterproductive outcomes. Firstly, paying ransoms offers no assurance of the hostages' safe return and could embolden terrorist groups by creating a lucrative business model out of kidnappings. This not only sets a precedent but could also lead to an increase in such incidents, as terrorists perceive hostage-taking as a successful strategy to extort resources from governments.
Agreeing to terrorists' demands can inadvertently support their operations. The influx of funds from ransoms might sustain a terrorist group’s control over territories, enable them to compensate their members, and finance further terrorist activities and abductions. Such outcomes contribute to the persistence of the groups (although this is contested by Jessica’s recent research).
Negotiating with terrorists might also inadvertently lend legitimacy to the terrorist groups, their objectives, and their methods. It sends a signal that their tactics are effective, potentially inspiring others and lending credibility to their causes from the viewpoints of their supporters. This recognition can lead to an escalation of violence, as negotiations could be exploited by militant factions to buy time to regroup or plan further attacks. Additionally, the process of negotiation can create fractures within terrorist groups, emboldening hardline splinters to perpetuate even more extreme forms of violence to undermine any potential peace efforts.
From a political standpoint, engaging in talks with terrorists can contribute to the destabilization of democratic states. It can shake the confidence in the government, particularly if negotiations are perceived as yielding to the demands of terrorists. This not only undermines the democratic process but also weakens the broader norm of resolving conflicts through non-violent means. International efforts to delegitimize and combat terrorism can be undercut.
Lastly, history has shown that settlements reached through negotiations with terrorist groups are often fragile, leading to a recurrent cycle of violence. The rationale behind a non-negotiation policy is based on the idea of removing any incentive for terrorist organizations to take hostages. By unequivocally denying potential gains from such acts, the aim is to ultimately discourage terrorists from engaging in hostage-taking as a strategy.
Drawbacks to Non-Negotiation
The refusal to negotiate with terrorists has not conclusively deterred the kidnapping of citizens from the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada, nor has it consistently facilitated their release. Hostage-taking continues, with perpetrators often indifferent to the national policies of their victims' countries of origin. To kidnappers, foreigners can represent potential income and have propaganda value, irrespective of their nation's stance on negotiation.
Internationally, there is a consensus among the global community to deter ransom payments, but adherence to this pact varies, casting doubt on the collective resolve to a strict non-negotiation policy. The practice of negotiating, while publicly denied, occurs under the guise of various pretexts. Germany, for instance, has been reported to have paid a ransom disguised as humanitarian aid to secure the release of hostages in Mali. Similarly, third-party intermediaries are sometimes engaged to conduct negotiations indirectly, sidestepping official policies. This inconsistency highlights the challenges of a unified global approach to terrorism and raises questions about the effectiveness of non-negotiation as a deterrent.
High-ranking officials and diplomats are often prioritized in secretive negotiations, contrary to public statements. Companies with the means to carry ransom insurance tend to secure the release of their employees through private means. Those less protected, such as freelancers and solo travelers, could find themselves at the end of the priority list, relying on their families who face the moral dilemma and legal risks of financing potential terrorist activities.
When negotiations are off the table, governments might resort to military interventions, which carry their own risks and uncertainties. For example, South African Pierre Korkie, who was supposedly in the process of being freed from Al Qaeda after his family reportedly negotiated a ransom deal, was killed along with 9 others during a failed rescue attempt by American forces in 2014.
The assumption that paying ransoms leads to an increase in terrorist attacks isn't as clear-cut as it might seem. In Jessica's article, the research shows a more nuanced picture: while one studied group did experience an uptick in violence correlated with receiving ransoms, for other groups, ransom payments were linked to either a decrease in the number of attacks or a reduction in their severity. This suggests that the effects of ransom payments on terrorist activity are more complicated than the prevailing logic might suggest.
The strict adherence to a non-negotiation stance has negatively impacted the development of best practices for handling similar situations. While the public rhetoric remains firm, the behind-the-scenes actions suggest a need to re-evaluate and potentially establish a more pragmatic and informed approach to negotiating with terrorist groups.
Best Practices for Negotiation
Engagement with terrorist organizations isn't always advantageous and heavily depends on the specifics of each situation. Nevertheless, there are certain considerations that could help increase the chances of positive outcomes in negotiations:
Understanding the Terrorist
The initial best practice involves comprehensive information gathering about the terrorist. This step is crucial to discern whether the group is more ideologically driven or pragmatic in its approach, which can influence their openness to negotiations. For example, organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, despite their ideologies, have participated in pragmatic political behaviors. They are likely to be better candidates for negotiations than, for example, extremely ideologically driven lone actors. Distinguishing whether the captors are purely politically motivated or also engage in criminal activities for profit is vital, as this influences the strategy and potential incentives offered during negotiations. If hostages are taken for ideological reasons, it could be harder to come to an agreement as the terrorists make no demands and instead consider their actions as purely punitive.
It's also essential to determine if the group has state sponsorship, which can affect their adherence to negotiated agreements. Depending on the relationship between the sponsor and the group, there could be more value in negotiating directly with the state.
Early Engagement and Controlled Implementation
Engaging early with the group is essential, as trust-building is a gradual process that requires time. Early discussions not only help in understanding the kidnappers' demands and capabilities but also in confirming who actually holds the hostages. This is crucial to ensure negotiations are not misled by external parties falsely claiming involvement. Professional negotiators often advocate for initiating dialogue promptly and managing any necessary ransom payments with extreme caution. This includes using marked bills and conducting surveillance to trace the funds, potentially aiding in a rescue operation or even dismantling a financial network.
Future Outlook
The lucrative nature of kidnapping and hostage-taking, especially as a method to raise funds, means that it is unlikely to stop regardless of any international pact to stop negotiating with terrorists. The practice continues and, in many instances, has resulted in the safe return of hostages. Negotiation, though not universally applicable or morally unambiguous, can sometimes lead to outcomes that align with counter terrorism objectives, including the potential for constructive engagement.
Current trends do not suggest significant shifts in the stances of many Western countries, though Canada might consider policy adjustments to decriminalize ransom payments by families, a point of divergence with the US approach. In the wider context, it is crucial to learn from past mistakes in tactics and to view negotiation as it truly is—an opportunity for two parties to reach a consensus. This perspective shifts the narrative from viewing negotiation and concessions as signs of governmental weakness to recognizing them as strategic tools in conflict resolution.
The impact of negotiations on public opinion remains an area for further exploration. It's important to assess whether public sentiment actually aligns with non-negotiation policies and whether the public understands the potential benefits of negotiating, particularly in terms of sustaining trust in government responses during crises. Furthermore, while media coverage can pressure governments to take action, it can also obscure decision-making during negotiations and potentially escalate conflicts. Additional research into the most effective media management strategies would also valuable. Finally, understanding how negotiation outcomes vary depending on the lead actor—whether it's a state, business, or private entity—could also provide important insights into the general odds and factors of negotiation success.
Negotiation is not an all-encompassing solution and is filled with complexities, such as public dissent and political opposition, which can impede its progress. Therefore, while keeping the negotiation channel open is valuable, it is equally important to recognize the many factors that influence its success. While best practices provide a foundation for negotiation strategies with terrorist groups, they highlight that there is no uniform solution for every scenario. Ultimately, negotiation should remain an option within the counter terrorism toolkit, employed cautiously and with a clear understanding of its potential and limitations.
Did you find this post insightful? Share it with a colleague!
Our terrorist financing analysis course caters to researchers, intelligence, law enforcement, and compliance professionals to help them learn about terrorist financing, and analyze suspicious patterns and activities more effectively. Sign up today!
© 2024 Insight Threat Intelligence Ltd. All Rights Reserved.
This newsletter and its contents are protected by Canadian copyright law. Except as otherwise provided for under Canadian copyright law, this newsletter and its contents may not be copied, published, distributed, downloaded or otherwise stored in a retrieval system, transmitted or converted, in any form or by any means, electronic or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.