RCMP Intelligence
Primer
Welcome to our second Insight Monitor Primer. Today we’re welcoming a new author, ITI researcher Brett W! With the recent prosecution of Cameron Ortis, RCMP intelligence activities and the organizations' abilities to collaborate with other Canadian security agencies are in the news. This primer on the RCMP’s intelligence functions describes the activities and limitations of the organization in this domain.
History
The RCMP was formed in 1920 as the Federal police force in Canada, merging two existing police forces with national security and intelligence as part of its mandate. In 1950, the RCMP Special Branch (along with a national security intelligence function) was created. Special Branch was restructured as the Directorate of Security and Intelligence in 1962, then renamed the Security Service in 1970. In 1984, many intelligence functions were transferred to the civilian Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s, the primary focus of RCMP intelligence was on Marxist, anarchist, labour and fascist individuals organizing inside Canada; as part of this policing activity, the RCMP often targeted people based on ethnicity. Following WWII, the RCMP returned to monitoring a broad range of leftist, feminist , labour and Quebec separatist causes from the 1950’s to the 1980’s .
RCMP Intelligence collection regularly violated the law, and after a parliamentary inquiry in 1969 and very public intelligence failures (including burning down a barn) the federal government launched the McDonald Commission in 1981. The Commission recommended the creation of a civilian intelligence agency and many of the RCMP’s existing intelligence staff and undercover agents were transferred to the new CSIS in 1984.
The creation of CSIS did not remove policing functions related to national security from the RCMP. However, it did split responsibilities between CSIS and the RCMP; the resulting intelligence sharing issues created serious limitations, including the failure detect and disrupt the Air India bombing.
Following the September 11th attacks in the United States, the Canadian Parliament expanded antiterrorism legislation and resources for both organizations. This added to the overlap between the RCMP's national security policing mandate and CSIS’s intelligence collection and dissemination mandate.
In 2015, the RCMP's intelligence functions were reorganized under the National Intelligence Coordination Centre with the goal of improved information sharing and cooperation.
Understanding the history of the RCMP’s colonial policing roots, the abuses of mid-20th-century RCMP intelligence gathering, and the overlap of functions with CSIS helps explain many aspects of the Cameron Ortis trial including the persistent failures of basic management oversight and the lack of standard controls on intelligence material.
RCMP Intelligence
The RCMP’s direction and intelligence priorities are the responsibility of the Parliament of Canada, Parliamentary committees, and the Minister of Public Safety. The Government of Canada’s priorities are set through a five month process that begins with consultations with the intelligence community and concludes with cabinet approval and the issuance of ministerial directives by appropriate ministers.1 Once the agenda has been set, detailed planning is directed by headquarters in Ottawa under the RCMP Commissioner.
The specific laws that authorize the RCMP to act are the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, 1985 and other public safety Acts. Oversight of RCMP intelligence functions comes from the Cabinet Committee on Global Affairs and Public Security and the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security Direct supervision of the RCMP comes from the Minister of Public Safety and the RCMP Commissioner
Planning
RCMP national intelligence planning is centralized in Ottawa. The RCMP’s intelligence strategy is outlined for ‘Federal Policing’, which covers national security policing, international policing, financial crime, protective operations, organized crime, & cybercrime. Planning is also done for ‘Specialized Policing Services’, which covers criminal intelligence analysis and sensitive investigations.
The structural split between what the RCMP classifies as ‘Criminal Intelligence’ and ‘National Security Intelligence’ is a key point of ambiguity. The conflict over what is ‘National Security’ and what is ‘Criminal’ is what various scholars and the McDonald Commission report identify as an example of the politicization of RCMP policing powers.
Collection
Collection of national security intelligence using signals intelligence against foreign nationals is the responsibility of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE); intelligence from certain human sources is the responsibility of CSIS. The RCMP also collects criminal intelligence information, acts as an information broker between police forces within Canada, and collaborates with foreign police services / INTERPOL on prosecuting international criminal networks. The RCMP collects some human source criminal intelligence, but the distinction is ambiguous and can overlap with national security intelligence collection.
For domestic and transnational organized crime, the RCMP maintains the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) and for cybercrime the National Cybercrime Coordination Centre (NC3). Some areas of concern with RCMP intelligence collection is the use of technologies like cell site simulators and undercover agents who use entrapment.
Analysis
Through the CISC and N3, the RCMP analyzes intelligence to produce intelligence briefs. National Security intelligence generally flows from CSE and CSIS to the RCMP through Strategic Case Management (SCM) and Tactical Deconfliction (TD), processes that can involve meetings or written communication called Use Letters.
The National Intelligence Coordination Centre (NICC), located in RCMP headquarters, acts as a central information sharing location between CSIS, CSE, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), the Five Eyes (a formal intelligence sharing agreement between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand ), and RCMP leadership. The prosecution of the former director of the NICC, Cameron Ortis, is providing insight into what is usually a highly secretive analysis process.
Within the NICC , Operations Research was set up to integrate information to inform strategic and tactical responses by the RCMP. The NICC has broad access to operational RCMP case files, provincial police agency information, intelligence provided by Canadian intelligence agencies, intelligence provided by allies, and sensitive Canadian corporate cybersecurity and financial information.
Dissemination
Intelligence is primarily disseminated to the RCMP’s national security policing functions. The materials come in the form of briefs from their own criminal intelligence organizations and Use Letters from other intelligence organizations. The RCMP also collaborates with local police forces, the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and other government departments in distributing intelligence products. Timely dissemination of intelligence remains a major issue for the RCMP.
Oversight
RCMP oversight falls under many different institutions including:
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) has investigated RCMP intelligence collection techniques like cell site simulators and integration of new technology like facial recognition.
Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC) is mandated to conduct reviews of RCMP national security operations, but does not have broad access to classified information. Those reviews can be blocked by the RCMP Commissioner, and an onerous process of review by a retired judge is required before the information can be viewed.
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) was created in 2019 to review the activities of intelligence agencies in Canada, replacing the Security Intelligence Review Committee. NSIRA review of RCMP intelligence functions has included reports on the interaction between Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), CBSA - RCMP biometrics collection and storage practices and CSIS - RCMP information sharing.
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) has announced a review of the RCMP intelligence functions, but the report has not been released.
The Future of RCMP Intelligence
Intelligence is a critical aspect of modern policing. Significant challenges have plagued the RCMP’s collection, analysis, and dissemination of that intelligence over the force’s history and many of those challenges have not been fully resolved. The Cameron Ortis trial has also shed light on serious breaches in the RCMP’s own internal security practices. As criminal and national security issues increasingly blur, the RCMP will face new challenges around using intelligence in its investigations (the “intelligence to evidence” problem) and in responding to international criminal organizations that increasingly play a role in national security issues.
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“Canadian Intelligence Prioritization” (Government of Canada Privy Council Office, January 2021).