Security and Intelligence Priorities for the Carney Government
What a week it’s been! Last week, I was in Doha, Qatar, for the Global Security Forum. This is my third year attending the forum, and it was as good as ever. This event helps me set my research priorities for the year and is a great chance to engage globally on a host of issues with a wide variety of partners, clients, and collaborators. The timing couldn’t have been better – I got to talk Canadian politics with people who probably gave almost no thought to Canadian politics before (everyone was asking me about the election!). There was even some talk of Canada’s place in the world, with some arguing we are well-positioned to join the European Union (a move I support if only for the cheese). It was a great time to consider Canada’s place in the world and where Canada should go next.
Following the Liberal election victory, Stephanie Carvin laid out her national security priorities for the Carney government on her Substack. We’ve agreed (along with our co-host, Leah West) to do our final episode of Secure Line on this topic.
This promises to be a heady mix of issues for Canada, both domestic and international. Before this episode, I thought I’d lay out some of my logic and rationale for what I believe the Carney government’s top four national security priorities should be. A quick disclaimer: I chose four to align with Stephanie’s list. However, I also think that nothing is a priority if a government has anything more than a handful of priorities. So here are what I think the Carney government’s top four national security priorities should be:
1. RCMP Reform
Readers of this newsletter will not find this surprising. I’ve long been critical of the RCMP’s underperformance in matters of national security. Much of this is driven by structural issues and the overly broad mandate of the RCMP, which focuses on both federal and local policing. The RCMP also has many other responsibilities and activities that contribute to policing across Canada. This broad mandate has made it difficult for the RCMP to protect resources for long and complex investigations like financial crimes, as community policing resourcing often takes priority. Former Prime Minister Trudeau discussed this in his white paper, which he released on his last day in office. There’s a strong case to be made for separating federal policing responsibilities from contract policing, either under a functionally separate structure or a new enforcement agency. This is an issue whose time has come. I’ll likely have more to say about this shortly.
Along with RCMP reform, we need to do something about financial crimes enforcement. One option that the Trudeau government pursued, but did not execute, was the creation of a financial crimes agency. From my perspective, I see two different models. Creating a standalone financial crimes agency would be beneficial without RCMP reform. However, financial crimes are intricately linked to all federal crimes, like espionage, foreign interference, serious organized crime, professional money laundering, sanctions evasion, terrorism, and political corruption. Because of this, the best solution for Canada is a reformed RCMP with a more explicit mandate, protected resources for federal policing (or even a standalone federal policing RCMP), which includes financial crimes. But if that doesn’t happen, a standalone financial crimes agency is the next best option.
One thing I don’t think we need to prioritize now is terrorism and violent extremism. That’s not to say that I don’t think it’s an issue – it certainly is!
What I think, however, is that our systems are working pretty well in that regard. We’re seeing preventative arrests and peace bonds, and a generally low level of terrorism (compared internationally, despite it being a high threat level compared to Canadian history). In fact, I’d argue that this type of policing is the thing the RCMP does best. Does that mean it’s perfect? Of course not: I’d love to see more after-actions and lessons learned shaping policy and operations to fine-tune this process. But does the RCMP succeed in threat-to-life investigations? Broadly speaking, yes. So this isn’t the place where I think we need to place our priorities (for now). We need to maintain and fine-tune our approach.
2. Enhanced and expanded intelligence relationships beyond the US
The United States is Canada’s main intelligence partner. There is no doubt in my mind that this continues to be true. However, given what’s happening in the United States with some senior appointments and their concerning views on one of our main adversaries (Russia), the gutting of the FBI, staff reductions at intelligence agencies, and the overall antagonistic relationship with Canada that Trump seems intent on pursuing, this cannot continue. Canada needs to diversify its intelligence relationships beyond the US, eventually looking to replace the importance of that relationship with a network of new and expanded intelligence sharing agreements.
Of course, Canada has existing intelligence relationships beyond the US. We have the other members of the Five Eyes, and intelligence sharing with them can often be very robust, sometimes even surpassing intelligence sharing with the US on specific issues and operations. Beyond the Five Eyes, we also have intelligence sharing agreements with other European countries and countries around the world. All of these existing agreements need to be nurtured. We need to spend far more time strategically cultivating these relationships on areas of mutual interest to create redundancies in our intelligence relationships and networks, and diversify away from the United States. Shared interests should dictate intelligence relationships: We increasingly have fewer and fewer shared interests with the United States, and our intelligence apparatus should respond accordingly.
3. Enhanced collection and use of intelligence for economic security and trade
What are Canadian interests when it comes to intelligence collection and sharing? Certainly, security issues like terrorism, foreign interference and espionage are critical. However, I would go beyond this and argue that Canadian interests that should be supported by robust intelligence collection relate primarily to economic security and trade. That’s not to say that this capability doesn’t exist: it does. Canada already has a strong program on economic security, and some support for trade from intelligence. But if our current capabilities sit at a 5/10, we should be turning that up to a 9/10 or a 10/10. This would provide Canada (and our allies) with crucial intelligence, and support the development of trade relationships worldwide, helping us diversify away from the United States.
This is also a place where Canada could develop a very niche area of expertise. We already have a head start and expertise with the Investment Canada Act and supporting intelligence activities. Canada could use this expertise to support our allies, security and trade partners, and shore up those critical networks.
One additional capability that would be useful on this front would be the creation of a foreign human intelligence agency. Canada already collects some foreign intelligence through a variety of capabilities, but a human foreign intelligence agency would provide a unique set of capabilities, support economic security and trade development, give Canada unique intelligence to share with our enhanced network of intelligence partnerships. It’s critical to remember that intelligence relationships are often based on the principle of “Give To Get”, so we have to have something worth giving to get useful intelligence in return. I don’t see this as a short-term solution, but certainly, the policy work to develop this could be started, perhaps through a secretariat at Public Safety. There are years of policy and implementation work ahead of this happening, so it would be a good idea to get started now, to support broader intelligence and security priorities.
4. Sanctions regime for criminal and cyber actors
Finally, Canada should prioritize creating a sanctions regime for criminal and cyber actors. Our partners in the US and the UK already have this capability: to list criminal actors and cyber gangs, and subject them to financial and administrative restrictions. In Canada, we cannot list, for instance, ransomware gangs, under any of our existing sanctions regimes. (There might be some instances where we could squint and make the case under the terrorism listings regime, or SEMA, but these would be a stretch and an inelegant, and possibly unlawful, use of these regimes.) Instead, Canada should create a dedicated regime to target these actors.
This is a pressing issue because Canada is one of the most targeted countries for ransomware actors. Having a sanctions regime would allow Canada to restrict the movement of funds to these criminal actors, which could have a deterrent effect on their activities targeting Canadians. It would also enhance the tools that we could bring to bear on these actors, and align us with our partners in the UK and the US to target criminal entities. Enhanced intelligence activities on economic security would also facilitate this sanctions regime. Ransomware actors target Canadian critical infrastructure, including hospitals, as well as universities, so establishing a sanctions regime against criminal actors could be beneficial. It could also be used against international criminal organizations, and if done correctly, might unlock new investigative tools to facilitate complex investigations.
We’re going to talk this through next week for Secure Line, so you’ll get more details and debate on these proposed priorities. You’ll want to tune in to find out what Leah and Stephanie think, so keep an eye on your podcast feeds later next week. In the meantime, you can get caught up on the first season of Secure Line here, on YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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